concurs; he also uses ziyâlılar and intelligentsiia interchangeably.
3 Edward Lazzerini uses "intelligentsia" to refer to educated elites while distinguishing between Islamic scholars as the "religious intelligentsia" and Jadidists as the "secular intelligentsia." 4 Danielle Ross further qualifies Lazzerini's "secular intelligentsia" with ideological designators such as "liberal," "nationalist," and "revolutionary," 5 a position that I have also emphasized, although with less emphasis on the term "intelligentsia." 6 Thus the existence of a Russian Muslim intelligentsia, and its correspondence to or connections with Jadidism as a progressive reformist movement among Russia's Muslims, seems to be taken for granted in the literature with a few exceptions, which I discuss below. 7 However, while the conceptual history of the term "intelligentsia" has been a fruitful topic of research in the context of the Russian and especially the Polish intelligentsias, 8 a similar study in the context of Russia's Muslims has not yet been undertaken. Even the otherwise remarkable Tatar Encyclopedia does not offer an entry on intelligentsiia or its likely Turkic equivalent ziyâlılar. 9 In this article, I trace the emergence and early evolution of the concept of intelligentsia among Russia's Muslims, with a focus on Russia proper as distinct from the later colonized territories of the Caucasus region and Central Asia. In addition to marking the birth of the Russian Muslim intelligentsia during the revolution of 1905, this conceptual history provides important insights about the self-perception and societal positioning of the Russian Muslim intelligentsia. Most important, it highlights how Muslim intellectuals modeled themselves after the Russian, Polish, and other intelligentsias in conceiving of themselves as an intelligentsia, partly due to Gasprinskiy's notable role in translating Russian conceptions of the intelligentsia into the Russian Muslim context. It also documents how the early Russian Muslim intelligentsia perceived itself as a secular societal force responsible for and in charge of bringing progress to Russia's Muslims and, which is important, as distinct from the ulama, the network of Islamic scholars. Therefore, although one might conceptualize the Russian Muslim intelligentsia for purposes of historical analysis as broadly including at least some Islamic scholars, this has to be done with caution, because the early 20th-century Russian Muslim language of practice designated the "intelligentsia" as a more specific cohort of lay activists. This designation did not automatically exclude individuals with an Islamic education-especially since opportunities for lay education remained significantly limited for most Muslims in the empire. For inclusion, however, it required commitment to a modernist and secularist mode of progress as promoted by Gasprinskiy, those like him, and their followers among Russia's Muslims. 10 The term "Jadidism" would inherit this connotation from its precursor "intelligentsia" when it became popular in the aftermath of the revolution of 1905.
An understanding of the conceptual history of "intelligentsia" among Russia's Muslims becomes even more critical in light of a relatively new intervention in the field that aims to enable alternative pathways of study in the historiography of Eurasia's Muslims by undermining the reified image of Jadidism. We should first grant that the term "Jadidism" and the phenomena it has come to designate have indeed been reified in scholarship repeatedly to warp public discourse in politically charged ways. 11 We should also acknowledge that explorations beyond what its critics have called the "Jadidocentric scholarship" have actually enabled invaluable contributions to the field. 12 Yet, as might be expected, the self-conscious attempt to debunk "Jadidocentric scholarship" has produced biases and blind spots of its own. Most conspicuously, some of the most forceful articulations of this incipient anti-Jadidist literature obfuscate-if not disregard-the origins of both the term "Jadidism" and the phenomena it has come to represent. They identify "Jadidism" almost exclusively in Central Asia, almost completely divorced from its Crimean, Volga-Ural, and indirectly Ottoman Westernist precursors. While trying to link it to transregional Muslim puritanist movements, moreover, they downplay-if not completely ignore-the Westernist, positivist, and secularist agendas of both Russian and Central Asian Jadidism. 13 The literature on Jadidism has already identified religious and secularist versions of Russian Muslim reformism as two intertwined but otherwise distinct intellectual pathways.
14 Additionally, the findings of this article demonstrate that a Russian Muslim intelligentsia, as the precursor to what later became known as the Jadidist movement, was born at the turn of the 20th century in European Russia. Moreover, Gasprinskiy's late 19th-century publications about a lay societal vanguard to lead Russia's Muslims into secularly defined progress played a crucial role in the self-identification of the members of this intelligentsia. 
Preparing for a Russian Muslim Intelligentsia
The earliest reference to a Russian Muslim intelligentsia that I have been able to identify belongs to Gasprinskiy. This is not surprising for two reasons. First, Gasprinskiy had received most of his education in Russian schools and developed an intimate familiarity with Russian intellectual circles at a time when the Russian intelligentsia gained striking visibility. Second, while narrative sources in manuscript form demonstrate an intellectual revival among Islamic scholars in Russia beginning in the mid-18th century and continuing into the Soviet era, censorship requirements limited contributions to this revival in print media at least until the late 19th century. 15 In an environment where the tsarist administration especially kept the periodical press beyond the reach of Muslim publishers, 16 Gasprinskiy published the only long-lived and Muslim-owned periodical in the empire between 1883 and 1914. 17 He was interested in the role of the intelligentsia as agents of social and cultural progress. It would be misleading to suggest that Islamic scholars were disinterested in improving the circumstances of their coreligionists, but they saw improvement in the revival of existing Muslim institutions, whereas Gasprinskiy pursued the adoption of new institutions and modes of thinking with European origins. 18 And unlike other lay Muslim intellectuals who may also have been interested in the idea of an intelligentsia as agents of secular progress, Gasprinskiy owned a periodical by which to promote his ideas.
Gasprinskiy named this periodical Tercüman, meaning "translator," which he simultaneously published in a parallel Russian edition to satisfy censorship requirements until 1905 under the name Perevodchik, again meaning "translator." In 1886, he wrote an editorial in this periodical where he expressed his hope for the formation of an intelligentsia among Russia's Muslims. 19 in Russian and then had someone translate them into Turkic or translated them himself. 20 These were usually loose translations, and both his choices in translation and the differences in the Russian and Turkic versions of his essays can sometimes be quite revealing.
21 This is the case with his 1886 editorial on the intelligentsia. He names the Russian version of the article simply "Intelligentsiia," but in the absence of a corresponding term in Turkic, he improvises and uses "Erkân-ı Cem'iyet" (Pillars of Society). Thus we can conclude that Gasprinskiy was not simply translating a term in this editorial; he was introducing a new concept to his Turkic-speaking Muslim audience.
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The choice of "Pillars of Society" to denote the intelligentsia as well as Gasprinskiy's remarks in the body of the editorial indicate how he imagined the intelligentsia at this inaugural moment. Above all, they reveal a strongly elitist approach. As Gasprinskiy writes:
It is known that the people who constitute and organize a society are not all at the same level. They differ in wealth, intellect, morality, knowledge, and skills. Differences in circumstances confer on people different purposes in life, too. Each individual thinks about himself and his own interests, but thinking for the community belongs to and concerns only those who are more advanced in intellect and morality. These people constitute an extremely important and vital part of any given society and are usually called the intelligentsia of a society or people [narod] 20 Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gasprinskii and Muslim Modernism," 22. Gasprinskiy wrote primarily in Crimean Tatar, his native tongue, but aspired to create a shared language for the Turkic-speaking Muslims of the Russian Empire and, unless explicitly specified, he addressed this broadly defined population from Eastern Europe to Central Asia in his writings. He often used the term "Tatar" to refer to his audience and their language, but he also used the terms "Türk" or "Türkî" (Turkic), and a careful analysis would reveal that in either case, he usually meant the Turkic-speaking Muslims outside the Ottoman Empire, not the smaller populations of the Crimean Tatars or the Kazan Tatars in the Volga-Ural region. Such ethnic designations solidified later, from the early 20th century on, especially in the Soviet era. Therefore, I give preference to the terms "Turkic" and "Muslim" in this article but preserve the originals of other designators in quoting other sources. On Gasprinskiy's conceptions of linguistic and national identity as well as the repercussions of these conceptions among Russia's Muslims, A society without this elite, in Gasprinskiy's opinion, is like a "helpless orphan" or a "corpse without a head." 23 He expects the "pillars of society" to express concern for ordinary people and to have knowledge, understanding, goodwill, and wealth with which they can serve society. He also wants them to be willing to make sacrifices, "braving personal harm and exertion," to help society acquire the "necessary circumstances, education, and ideas for its prosperity and progress." 24 Students of the Russian intelligentsia will recognize in Gasprinskiy's language references to the discourse of the Russian Populists who wanted to "go to the people" in the 1870s, to the activism of the "small-deeds liberals" in the 1880s, and to the Russian intelligentsia's overall trope of self-sacrifice for societal improvement. 25 Gasprinskiy was certainly looking up to the Russian intelligentsia as a model. First, as previously noted, he was intimately familiar with Russia's intellectual environment. He had studied at the Moscow Military Academy in 1865-67 and befriended the family of the famous Pan-Slavist Mikhail Katkov (1818-87), who at this time was editing the conservative newspaper Moskovskie vedomosti. 26 Second, Gasprinskiy himself refers to the Russian intelligentsia as the model for his conception of the "pillars of society" among Muslims. He writes that until Peter I, the Russians did not have an intelligentsia either. They had nobility, clergy, merchantry, and peasantry but not a distinct class in society to show others a "better way" and to think about the "common good." Peter I changed this situation in Gasprinskiy's opinion by giving "orders for the education and intellectual development of his country," by opening "necessary schools," and by bringing the "sciences and knowledge of Europe to Russia." This gave birth to the 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. Russian intelligentsia, Gasprinskiy concludes, and already by Catherine II's time, its intelligentsia enabled Russia to occupy a place among the "educated" and "powerful" nations of the world.
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Thus Gasprinskiy had a particular image of the Russian intelligentsia as he was translating this concept into the Russian Muslim domain. He was not thinking about the radical revolutionaries who have otherwise come to define popular conceptions of the Russian intelligentsia, as idealized in Sergei Nechaev's "Catechism of a Revolutionary" or Nikolai Chernyshevskii's cult novel What Is to Be Done? 28 Rather, he was referring to a competent, focused, and patriotic vanguard that in his opinion led Russian society into "prosperity and progress" through positive action. He wanted the tsarist empire's Muslims to have their own progressive vanguard.
But who could serve in that capacity? Paralleling his analysis of Russian society before Peter I, Gasprinskiy identifies three estates among Russia's Muslims as potential candidates for this purpose: nobility, merchantry, and Islamic scholars. He thinks the Muslim nobility enjoys both the trust of the state and the respect of the broader Muslim population, and it would be "justifiable to expect them" to exert themselves in leading their coreligionists "on the path of enlightenment and prosperity." However, he finds Muslim nobles and merchants lacking in "progress and enlightenment" themselves. "Dear reader," he asks rhetorically, "have you ever seen a Russian nobleman who is illiterate in Russian? … But I assure you that there are hundreds of Muslim nobles who are illiterate in their native language!" Islamic scholars, he writes, know what they study, but he finds what they study not to be of consequence in advancing society. "If their knowledge was broad and comprehensive," he laments, "then their life and works would be significant." But their exclusive focus on "religion and morality," in Gasprinskiy's opinion, disqualifies Islamic scholars from becoming the pillars of society. 29 Thus he comes to the "sad conclusion that Muslim society does not yet have an intelligentsia. Nobody enlightens it, nobody points out its ailments, nobody helps it out of the sea of ignorance, and nobody sacrifices his labor or even tears for their benefit." 30 However, Gasprinskiy also writes, "we cannot afford to lose our hope," and prophesizes that "sooner or later" Russia's Muslims will have "new people 27 Gasprinskiy, "Erkân-ı Cem'iyet," 4 March 1886. 28 Ivanov-Razumnik, Istoriia russkoi obshchestvennoi mysli (1907, repr. Moscow: Respublika, 1997), has had an important role in the consolidation of the antiestablishment image of the Russian intelligentsia. 29 Gasprinskiy, "Erkân-ı Cem'iyet," 7 March 1886. 30 Ibid.
with new ideas, high character, and sufficient means" to lead the society. 31 This last note is congruent with Gasprinskiy's efforts as an intellectual himself. As it has been well studied in the literature, Gasprinskiy devoted his adult life to producing those "new people" among Russia's Muslims through his publications, such as Tercüman, and through his educational initiatives.
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His efforts were quite consequential, too. However, seeing the fruits of his work would require time, and time was filled with frustrations and agony. Gasprinskiy revisited the issue of intelligentsia at least three more times before the revolution of 1905.
In an essay in 1892, he was still experimenting with the term "pillars" for a possible translation. Thus he chose "Nasha intelligentsiia" (Our Intelligentsia) for his title in Russian and "Erkân-ı Milliye" (Pillars of the Nation) in Turkic. He starts the Russian version of this essay with an emphatic question: "Splendid title, isn't it?" Then he discloses sarcastically that he will actually write about the "absence" of a Muslim intelligentsia, "because," he explains, "Muslim society does not have such an intellectually developed social stratum that will define the tone of life, lead the masses, and carry itself as a model for them." "The most lamentable aspect of Russia's Muslims is that they do not have such a class," he adds, "of enlightened men who are familiar with the affairs of life and the conditions of the world or who have the time to show the way to [the people] and to help and inform them: in short, 'pillars of the nation.' " He gives credit to Islamic scholars for being the society's pillars in religious affairs, but he desires the existence of a similar class to take care of the Muslims' "worldly affairs." At this point, Gasprinskiy broadens his comparative perspective and interjects: "Even the Georgians, Armenians, and Jews have already surpassed Muslims," thanks to the efforts of their "intellectual strata." 33 Nevertheless, in this essay, Gasprinskiy parts from his position in 1886 slightly and writes that Russia actually has hundreds of Muslims with a higher education and many more with a secondary education, who can serve as a vanguard to build "intellectual life" for their coreligionists. Presently, 31 Ibid. 32 The best English-language work on Gasprinskiy remains Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gasprinskii and Muslim Modernism." In Turkish, see Kırımer, Gaspıralı; and the contributions to Hakan Kırımlı, ed., İsmail Bey Gaspıralı İçin (Ankara: Kırım Türkleri Gençlik ve Yardımlaşma Derneği, 2004). A semiautobiographical, serialized, but unfinished novella that Gasprinskiy published in 1905-6 also highlights his self-image as an intellectual: Qart Agay (İsmâ'îl Bey Gasprinskiy), "Gün Doğdu," Tercüman, 9 November 1905-6 February 1906 (with irregular intervals). 33 İsmâ'îl Gasprinskiy, "Erkân-ı Milliye/Nasha intelligentsiia," Tercüman/Perevodchik, 23 April 1892.
however, he considers these educated Muslims to be good for nothing other than "getting bored, grieving, and not being able to find anything to do." He entreats them to "liven up and fulfill the productive and noble purpose of their lives by benefiting both themselves and society." Similar to Petr Lavrov (1823-1900)-who in his Historical Letters, published as a book in 1870, calls on "critically thinking individuals" among educated Russians to pay society back-Gasprinskiy asserts, "We, the advanced Muslims, … are obliged to think about our lesser brothers … and sacrifice ourselves for the education, progress, happiness, and well-being of the people to whom we belong."
34 He invites those "advanced Muslims" to mobilize to this end. He reasons that if each "advanced Muslim" did "something good and useful, albeit insignificant by itself," the sum of those small deeds would amount to a "big deal." 35 In 1893, Gasprinskiy gave up erkân (pillars) as a way to express "intelligentsia" in Turkic and started to experiment with ziyâlı (enlightened) instead. He wrote an essay titled "An Address to Intellectual/Enlightened Muslims"-"Slovo k intelligentnym musul´manam" in Russian and "Ziyâlı Müsülmanlara (Bir Hitâb)" in Turkic. In the Russian version of this essay, he refers to "our intellectuals" (nashi intelligenty) without giving a definition and therefore assuming that his readers are already familiar with the term. In the Turkic version, however, he describes "enlightened Muslims" as "somewhat more knowledgeable and educated when compared to the dark masses" and "informed about the conditions of the times, familiar with the practical sciences pertaining to life, and versed in Russian and other languages." Finally, in his concluding sentence of the Turkic version of the essay, Gasprinskiy also refers to ziyâlılar in the plural as a substantive, which comes closest to a oneword replacement for intelligentsia. 36 Gasprinskiy actually uses ziyâlı in a less conspicuous way and in adjectival form in his 1886 essay when he translates the Russian phrase intelligentnyi sloi (intellectual stratum) as ziyâlı âdemler (enlightened men)
. 37 Yet at that point he does not yet seem to have made a conscious choice to relate intelligent (a member of the intelligentsia) and ziyâlı (enlightened). Then, in his 1892 essay, he matches umstvenno razvityi (mentally developed) with ziyâlı fehimli (enlightened understanding). 38 novel, he translates ziyâlı, again in adjectival form, simply as dobryi, meaning "good." 39 Therefore, Gasprinskiy's use of ziyâlı to translate intelligentnyi and of ziyâlılar for intellectuals in his 1893 address is a significant marker for the introduction of a Turkic substantive for intellectuals.
Nevertheless, intellectuals in the plural is different from intelligentsia as a collective body with a purpose, and despite the introduction of ziyâlılar as a substantive for intellectuals in this essay, Gasprinskiy does not seem to have changed his position from the previous year when it comes to the absence of a Russian Muslim intelligentsia. He does not think that the Muslim intellectuals in Russia have yet assumed social responsibility, a marker of intelligentsia status in his opinion. He agrees with what he presents as a common complaint among Muslim intellectuals: "It is completely true that our Muslim people is one of the most backward," and "the level of their knowledge and the productivity of their labor and industry stagnate below necessary and desirable levels." But he also chastises Muslim intellectuals for their inertia: "Complaining from a distance and disdaining from above does not confer pride on intellectuals [ziyâlılar] or benefit the ignorant. … We do not talk to them [ordinary Muslims]. How can they listen? We do not show them the way. How can they walk? We do not advise them. How can they keep our advice?" Then he issues one more call to action. He asks Muslim intellectuals to write instructive books, to open schools of general and practical knowledge, to introduce technical advancements in agriculture and industry to Muslims, and in general, to improve societal affairs among Muslims. 40 Finally, in yet another essay in 1904, Gasprinskiy still does not seem to have concluded that Muslim intellectuals in Russia have fulfilled their societal obligation. His Russian title for this essay is again "Nasha intelligentsiia." But although he continues to refer to intellectuals as ziyâlılar in the text, he chooses "Bizim Tabaqa-yı 'Âliye" (Our High Class) for a Turkic title, indicating that he had yet to settle on a satisfactory translation of "intelligentsia." This ambivalence of terms also reflects his continuing doubts about the absence of an actual intelligentsia among Russia's Muslims. He asks: "do we, the Muslims of Russia and especially the Turkic tribes, have an intelligentsia?" "From one point of view," he answers, "we do"-that refers to the presence of educated individuals-from another point of view, however, "if we apply to these people the least measure that determines the features and meaning 39 İsmâ'îl Gasprinskiy, "Frengistan Mektubları," Tercümân, 14 March 1888. 40 Gasprinskiy, "Ziyalı Müsülmanlara," 25 March 1893.
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In this essay, perhaps reflecting the growing politicization of the population in the tsarist empire, Gasprinskiy adds one more element, which was implied but not spelled out previously, to his defining criteria for the intelligentsia status: that is, national consciousness. He remarks sarcastically:
History does not know such an original "type" of intelligent as ours. He is a good, ordinary, reliable person in the capacity of a lawyer, government official, officer, physician, or engineer, but in specific terms, he does not know who he is. He knows that he is not Armenian, Georgian, or Jewish, but that is it ([in Turkic:] but they do not know that they belong to the Turkic nation [Türk qavmi]). … There is no nation or smaller people whose intelligentsia is not interested in its native tongue, native literature, poetry, and history, but our intellectuals do not want to know anything about that. … Sometimes [our intellectual] can even do philanthropy, but his philanthropy never concerns his own people. He is for himself and the people are for themselves.
"Therefore," Gasprinskiy concludes in the Russian version, "we have educated Tatars but we do not have a Tatar intelligentsia."
Nonetheless, Gasprinskiy maintains his usual optimism and ends this essay, too, on a positive note: "This situation is beginning to change and signs of ideas … as well as patriotic exertion are starting to appear. All our affairs are at the beginning stage, but the progress and completion of an affair depends on its beginning. Thankfully, beginnings exist. We hear about them. We see them." 42 One might be tempted to dismiss these four essays as isolated texts that appeared over a period of 18 years in a periodical the circulation of which did not at its peak exceed a few thousand of the Russian Empire's nearly 20 million Muslims.
43 Such a response would be justified if we were using these figures to prove the existence of a Muslim intelligentsia in the tsarist empire before the revolution of 1905. On the contrary, however, the point here is that Gasprinskiy's observations and word choices indicate the absence of both a Russian Muslim intelligentsia and the concept of "intelligentsia" among Russia's Muslims. In 
44

The Birth of the Russian Muslim Intelligentsia
45 When a Muslim intelligentsia eventually emerged in the wake of the revolution of 1905, as has been commonly acknowledged in the historiography, it came out of this progressive network. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect Gasprinskiy's conceptualization of the intelligentsia in Tercüman to have a direct impact on the self-definition and sensitivities of a Russian Muslim intelligentsia. Of course, as we have also pointed out, Gasprinskiy was not writing in a vacuum. He was closely following and visibly influenced by the Russian-language public discourse on the intelligentsia. The future members of the Russian Muslim intelligentsia would also access and appropriate that discourse in their own terms, without Gasprinskiy's mediation or even in contradiction to his interpretations. However, this does not take away from the seminal importance of Gasprinskiy's preparatory work for more than two decades before 1905.
Three documents indicating the birth of a Russian Muslim intelligentsia in the revolutionary period testify to this point and reveal the implications, limits, and utility of the concept of intelligentsia among Russia's Muslims at the moment of the birth of a Russian Muslim intelligentsia. These documents were filed in the personal archive of Fâtih Kerîmî (1870-1937), a wellconnected and politically active yet moderate, progressive intellectual who owned a successful Muslim printing house in Orenburg in 1905 and can in many respects be considered a mentee of Gasprinskiy. 46 The documents seem to have entered Kerimî's archive either to be printed as flyers at his printing house or because of his participation in their creation. One of the documents is typed in two slightly different copies with small corrections, indicating an editorial process, and significantly, all three documents are in Russian, perhaps because the Turkic languages of the empire had not yet acquired the vocabulary to articulate their content. The first document is the bylaw of a certain "Muslim Circle [kruzhok] of Petersburg Students." It lacks a date but was placed among other documents from 1905. The bylaw's authors announce three sets of objectives for their circle with regard to its members, the intelligentsia, and the "popular masses with their clergy [dukhovenstvo] ." The first set of objectives involves improving the cultural level of Muslim students and increasing their social and political consciousness to "present to the general mass of the Muslim intelligentsia individuals with reinforced feelings about religious and national awareness." 47 Hence the bylaw's authors seem to have expected the circle's student members to graduate into an existing "Muslim intelligentsia."
Most Muslim students in the Russian Empire attended madrasas that provided exclusively religious training, but in the 1890s, a few of these madrasas started to reform their curricula by introducing secular subjects. 48 Therefore, a small cohort of students received a partly secularized education in those reformed madrasas, and some others attended government schools, including the occasional ones designed particularly for Muslims, such as the Kazan Tatar Teachers' School. 49 As there was no madrasa in St. Petersburg, Muslim students normally came to the city to pursue a lay education, and reportedly a few recent graduates from reformed madrasas and government schools were also heading toward St. Petersburg for political activism at the beginning of the 20th century. 50 The authors of this bylaw probably targeted and were themselves lay students or recent graduates in St. Petersburg. They seem to have considered madrasa students who studied with religious aspirations and wanted to move into religious occupational positions upon graduation as belonging to the clergy and distinct from the intelligentsia. In the narrative of the bylaw, the intelligentsia stands apart from the "dark masses" with an accentuated responsibility to teach and guide while the clergy belongs to the "dark masses," albeit as one of its prominent constituents. Hence the bylaw's authors ask the circle's members "to reinforce contacts with" the broader Muslim population, "earn the confidence and sympathy of these dark masses," and establish active relations with the clergy to that end.
This sense of responsibility to the "popular masses" and to the objectives of the circle regarding the Muslim intelligentsia bears the stamp of Gasprinskiy's views and indicates that the bylaw's authors were well aware of the methods and historical background of the Russian as well as other intelligentsias. They envision the ultimate outcome of their interaction with the broader Muslim population and, therefore, the raison d'être of the circle along with the Muslim intelligentsia, as "serving the purpose of Muslim enlightenment and philanthropy." They write: "in the Caucasus, Orenburg, Crimea, and Kazan, there are already people who open schools, make generous donations, build mosques, in short, serve the purpose of Muslim enlightenment and philanthropy in one way or another." In more practical terms, the authors outline aspects of "Muslim enlightenment" as "fighting fanaticism, promoting European education, improving the condition of women, detecting the local genuine needs of the population, etc." Hence, as with Gasprinskiy's earlier position, the bylaw's authors hold the Muslim intelligentsia responsible to the broader Russian Muslim society in a patriotic sense and conceive that responsibility as inducing social and cultural transformation following European models.
The bylaw sets the student circle's primary objective regarding the Muslim intelligentsia as securing and preserving unity. Toward this end, the authors urge members of the intelligentsia to meet individually and with their families in private gatherings as well as at social events. They encourage the circle's student members to criticize the existing Muslim intelligentsia's "old and new forms of servility" unsparingly. 51 Although what the authors mean with this phrase remains somewhat unclear, it is likely that they were referring to an issue that Gasprinskiy had raised before when he complained about the disinterestedness of educated Muslims in the empire. In his 1904 essay, the "old teacher" or the "father," as the new generation of progressive Muslims would refer to Gasprinskiy, 52 criticizes the Muslim intellectuals' unconscientious effort to excel in their professional careers or become cultivated in ways defined by a cosmopolitan high culture filtered through the sensitivities of Russian educated society while failing to promote or even learn about their native culture. 53 His criticism of this attitude of servility closely matches the tone of the Muslim student circle's bylaw in Kerîmî's archive.
Finally, the bylaw anticipates the emergence of "core groups" in 10-15 years among the members of the intelligentsia in all places with a Muslim population. If this happens, the authors promise, each "intellectual, government employee, or merchant will find moral and perhaps material support from their co-believers" in these groups. Hence it seems that while the authors assume the existence of a Muslim intelligentsia, with Muslim government employees and merchants as its natural participants or allies, they also aspire to mold the Muslim intelligentsia into an easier-to-mobilize organization according to the model of the various networks and movements that the Russian and other intelligentsias had spawned. Indicating this self-consciously emulative process and paralleling Gasprinskiy's earlier references to the intelligentsias of other peoples, the authors write that the "examples of Jewish, Polish, and other circles" inspire them with hope for the "complete realization of their ideas." we note that while the authors of the address assume the existence of a Muslim intelligentsia, they expect it to evolve beyond an aggregate of individual intellectuals-as did Gasprinskiy-to fulfill its functions. This fulfillment requires a capacity to mobilize and act for change, and therefore the authors want existing Muslim intellectuals to develop a more coherent structure.
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The third document from Kerîmî's archive is a petition to the then mufti of the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly, Muhammedyâr Sultanof. Whereas the first two documents appear to have been prepared by unnamed and relatively young progressive Muslims from St. Petersburg, the authors of this petition were 35 Muslim notables-primarily merchants, aristocrats, and landowners-from various gubernias under the jurisdiction of the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly. Their initiative began in response to a request from Sergei Witte, chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1905, sent to Mufti Sultanof. Witte asked the mufti to prepare, in consultation with the Islamic scholars under his jurisdiction, a report on issues concerning the Spiritual Assembly. Toward this end, the mufti invited prominent Islamic scholars to a conference in Ufa. But since the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly-along with other spiritual assemblies in Crimea and the Caucasus region-was the primary administrative institution through which the tsarist state governed its Muslim subjects, what concerned the Spiritual Assembly concerned Russia's Muslims in general. Therefore, the petitioning Muslim notables wanted to be included in the process as well. In their appeal to the mufti, they first provided him with an outline of various issues that they deemed worthy of being discussed at the conference, then added that "all the Sunnite Muslims in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly … demand the participation in this Special Conference of representatives from the Muslim intelligentsia and from the trading and producing class alongside representatives of the clergy." To highlight the importance and necessity of their participation, the Muslim notables explain that the "trading and producing class" and the intelligentsia stand "close to all segments of the Muslim population; are familiar with Muslim life, customs, and occasions; and can express Muslims' needs and wishes." 57 In the end, the mufti declined the lay Muslim notables' request, and they managed to participate in the conference only as observers. 58 of this article, however, the petition remains significant, as it indicates that by 1905, in addition to self-proclaimed and anonymous Muslim intellectuals, prominent Muslim notables also recognized the existence of a Muslim intelligentsia distinct from both merchants and Islamic scholars. This was rather an amorphous group of individuals in terms of their social origins and occupations, as were the Russian or other intelligentsias in the empire, but it was tangible enough to claim a voice in the future of Russia's Muslims. As some educated Russian Muslims self-identified as members of an intelligentsia, as a distinct group with obligations to society, they also asserted their own ability to represent that society.
With the collapse of censorship in the Russian Empire in 1905, Gasprinskiy stopped publishing Perevodchik and continued to publish Tercüman only in Turkic. As a result, after this point we lose the opportunity to learn from comparing the Russian and Turkic versions of his writings. However, he continued to make several references to ziyâlılar and ziyâlı Muslims in the revolutionary years. A reading of these references does not provide much original content, since in some cases he even copies entire paragraphs from his earlier writings into the new ones. But the unequivocal repetition of the term ziyâlılar, it seems, had gradually introduced it to the empire's progressive Muslim reading public as the equivalent of both intellectuals in the plural and intelligentsia as a collective body. 59 The titles of two of the earliest-short-lived-Turkic journals in Russia were Ziyâ (1879, Light) and Ziyâ-yı Kavkazya (1880, The Light of the Caucasus). 60 The light metaphor has a deep legacy in Islamic tradition, going as far back as the Qur'an. 61 It often signifies divine guidance or divinely inspired knowledge in reference to the quality of light to make things manifest. 62 In the substantive form that Gasprinskiy used, ziyâlı was probably a calque of the French illuminé (enlightened), 63 and its choice-as opposed to a direct translation of the Russian intelligent or French intellectuel, both from the Latin intellegere (to understand)-brings the positive connotations of the light metaphor in Islamic tradition to the Muslim intelligentsia's claim for a leadership role among Russia's Muslims. As Gasprinskiy's 1886 essay already implies and as the petition of Muslim notables to Mufti Sultanof in 1906 explicitly states, members of the Muslim intelligentsia saw themselves as knowing what was best for society and were willing to work toward that goal out of a sense of patriotic commitment as an indispensable part of their societal function.
In the Volga-Ural region, ziyâlı soon started to indicate qualities of erudition, enlightenment, and devotion to society. Opposing factions among educated Volga-Ural Muslims agreed that being ziyâlı was a good thing, but they accused one another of claiming it falsely. 64 In 1908, for instance, the famous Kazan Tatar poet Ğabdullah Tuqay disliked an anonymous essay on Muslim education that he read in a Kazan-based Turkic journal. To satirize the author for haughtily assuming the appearance of an intellectual without the concomitant depth, he published a poem starting with the line: "He is an intellectual [ziyâlı], you know: he sells knowledge and wisdom." 65 In 1910, in another illustrative example, Halîl Ebulhanef, a progressive reformist intellectual with seemingly positivist or scientific inclinations, would further underline the positive connotations of being ziyâlı and write that the progressive and conservative factions among Volga-Ural Muslims were both against the "contemporary Tatar intelligentsia" (ziyâlılar), that they actually "feared reform," and that it was time "to reform all of the old life fundamentally." 66 Twentieth-century historians writing in Turkic languages, both in the Soviet Union and among the Volga-Ural Muslim diaspora, also used ziyâlı to refer to a Russian Muslim intelligentsia in the tsarist era, sometimes also glossing it with the word intelligentsiia for emphasis. 67 The Russian-Tatar dictionaries of the Soviet era eschewed the Turkic ziyâlılar and introduced intelligentsiia directly into Tatar-probably following the political mood that emphasized Russian over non-Russian languages after the early 1930s. 68 But the Tatar-Russian dictionaries during and after the Soviet era, and the Russian-Tatar dictionaries after it, featured both ziyâlılar and intelligentsiia as synonyms. 69 Thus whether in Turkic as ziyâlılar or in Russian as intelligentsiia, tsarist Russia's Muslims recognized the emergence of a Russian Muslim intelligentsia at the turn of the 20th century, and later specialists of VolgaUral Muslim history have repeatedly acknowledged and investigated the significance and legacy of this phenomenon.
Conclusion
Writing about the Russian and Polish intelligentsias, Andrzej Walicki and Jerzy Jedlicki both relate the emergence of intelligentsias to the leadership role of educated elites in premodern and agricultural societies whose states failed to live up to the challenges posed by the globalization of European modernity in the long 19th century. 70 The situation was more complicated for Russia's Muslims for two reasons. First, they had ready models to follow in the examples of the fully formed intelligentsias of several other peoples. The Russian and Polish intelligentsias had models to follow in the examples of European intellectuals, too, 71 but here the question is one of degree. The societal and political clout of the Russian and Polish (as well as Jewish, Georgian, and Armenian) intelligentsias was much more noticeable when Russian Muslim activists began to deliberate the subject in the late 19th century. These Muslim activists improvised to find solutions to the problems that they identified among their coreligionists, but they also studied, interacted with, and emulated the intelligentsias of other peoples-especially the Russian intelligentsia-as they developed their programs. Therefore, as with the evolution of other non-Russian intelligentsias in the empire, the evolution of the Russian Muslim intelligentsia was a less organic development than that of the evolutions of the Russian and Polish intelligentsias.
Second, in many of their societal affairs, Russia's Muslims interacted with the Russian state through the mediation of the spiritual assemblies and therefore Islamic scholars. 72 Gasprinskiy expressed frustration at the Russian state's failure to provide public services to its Muslim subjects as early as 1881 and asked it to support Muslims in the field of education. 73 Yet government investments in Muslim schooling would remain minimal until the end of the tsarist regime. 74 The spiritual assemblies and the network of Islamic scholars presented the next authority structure to which Gasprinskiy or other Russian Muslim reformists could turn. Almost every Muslim village had a mullah, and mullahs were already closely involved in the education and governance of the Muslim population. If we think of how a rapprochement between Russia's early intellectuals and the tsarist bureaucracy in the latter part of Nicholas I's reign provided the grounds for Russia's Great Reforms in the 1860s, as W. Bruce Lincoln tells us, 75 the analogue to this collaboration among Russia's Muslims would have been a cooperation between secularly educated progressive Muslims and Islamic scholars. However, while the tsarist bureaucracy and early Russian intellectuals shared European-inspired ideas and models as their points of reference despite differences in political orientation and professional attitudes, secular intellectuals and Islamic scholars among Russia's Muslims derived from such two fundamentally different points of reference as European modernity and Islamic tradition. 76 Of course, there were gray areas where scholars benefited from reformist ideas or otherwise secular intellectuals maintained religious concerns, but in general, the birth of the Muslim intelligentsia marked a split from the existing Muslim authority structures. This split needs to be kept in mind as we examine the conflict that became highly visible in Russia's Turkic-language print media in the years following the revolutionary period of 1905 between the progressive reformist intelligentsia, who came to be known as the Jadidists (proponents of the new), and the traditionalists, who were mostly Islamic scholars and came to be known as the Qadimists (proponents of the old).
Adeeb Khalid's The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform remains the most detailed analysis of this split. Khalid focuses on colonial Central Asia and conceptualizes the matter as a challenge that the progressive reformists posed to the established authority of Islamic scholars as well as wealthy community notables, with a new reading of Islam-that is, from within Islam. In Khalid's view, the progressive reformists, or Jadidists, of Central Asia had "never disowned Islam in the way that many Young Turks [of the Ottoman Empire] had done." 77 A similar observation about the continuing relevance of Islam in defining Central Asian Jadidism also informs the emerging anti-Jadidist literature's unwillingness to distinguish the secularist and religious pathways of Muslim reformism. Perhaps this was a peculiarity of Central Asian Jadidism, which developed after that of Russia proper. I have highlighted elsewhere that Islam was indeed relevant as a point of reference for the early Muslim progressive reformists of Russia proper, especially before the revolution of 1905, but this changed over time. The position of a younger generation of progressive intellectuals among Russia's Muslims-whom we can now call the "Russian Muslim intelligentsia"-was actually closer to that of the Young Turks, therefore posing a challenge to the authority of Islamic scholars from without.
78
The documents examined in this article suggest that Gasprinskiy and other Muslim intellectuals from European Russia perceived themselves as establishing a new authority structure in Russian Muslim society that was deliberately secular and distinct from that of Islamic scholars. The secularreligious divide that the progressive intellectuals took for granted is untenable in the view of the various societal and administrative functions that Islamic scholars fulfilled among Russia's Muslims. 79 Regardless, however, progressive intellectuals (or Jadidists) did not deem Islamic scholars to have the necessary credentials to conceive and carry out societal improvements as necessitated by the "conditions of the times." If the scholars helped with the intellectuals' reform projects, that was fine. But the scholars' position in giving direction to society had to follow the intelligentsia's secularly designed lead as justified by the claim that the intelligentsia was "close to all segments of the 77 Muslim population … and [could] express Muslims' needs and wishes"-by implication-unlike the Islamic scholars. 80 Yet, being close to the Muslim population in villages and urban neighborhoods, as well as giving direction to and expressing Muslims' needs and wishes, were precisely what Islamic scholars had historically been doing among Russia's Muslim communities.
As lay secularist intellectuals tried to carve out a new sphere of influence for themselves in Muslim society, they inevitably intruded on the purview of Islamic scholars. The outcome was a "parting of ways" similar to that of the Russian intellectuals and the tsarist state that, as Nicholas Riasanovsky suggests, occurred in the first half of the 19th century, while Russian intellectuals and bureaucrats worked together to plan the Great Reforms. 81 The effects of this split became starkly visible in the Russian case when intellectuals began to conceive their "selves" as individually capable of and responsible for ameliorating their environments, thereby self-consciously assuming intelligentsia status in the aftermath of the Great Reforms. 82 That perception and the evolution of a concomitant sense of social responsibility were what Gasprinskiy longed for until the revolution of 1905 and what eventually gave birth to a Muslim intelligentsia after the revolution.
A tendency in the scholarship to explain the split between the Muslim intelligentsia and Islamic scholars based on socioeconomic analysis and structural considerations deserves one last comment at this point. Stéphane Dudoignon leads the way in this regard with a seminal article he wrote in 1997, and Norihiro Naganawa as well as James Meyer and Danielle Ross have notably furthered his line of thinking. 83 These are all insightful works that have expanded our understanding of the circumstances in which the Russian Muslim intelligentsia evolved and interacted with the rest of Russian Muslim society, including its Islamic scholars. However, we should beware of pushing such structural analysis to the point where we regard various parties' intellectual responses to controversies spurred by the Muslim intelligentsia's emergence as no more than a byproduct of structural and socioeconomic circumstances. In the case of the Polish intelligentsia, for instance, Maciej Janowski provides a detailed and substantive outline of the institutions, venues, and broader structures that made the birth of the Polish intelligentsia possible in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. But it is clear in his analysis that what made this birth possible was different from what the Polish intelligentsia stood for in its demands and ideological convictions. 84 Similarly, understanding what the Russian Muslim intelligentsia stood for requires paying attention to their intellectual genealogy and ideological convictions, which Ross as well as I have done elsewhere. 85 One line in the intellectual genealogy of the Russian Muslim intelligentsia takes us to the 19th-century reformist Islamic scholars of the Volga-Ural region, such as Ebunnasr Ğabdunnasîr el-Qursâvî (1776-1812), Ğabdurrahîm bin Ğusman Utız İmenî (1754-1835), and, with more immediate relevance, Şihâbuddin Mercânî (1818-89). As emphasized in the recent anti-Jadidist literature, the contributions of these scholars fit in the global context of a puritanical Islamic revival since the 17th century. 86 They are important for legitimizing critical approaches to the region's Islamic traditions by using the possibilities of the Islamic tradition's broader confines per se; for laying the groundwork for the foundation of reformed institutions of Islamic education; and in the case of Mercânî, for introducing Eurocentric conceptions of history and identity among Volga-Ural Muslims, although at a preliminary level. 87 This is worth keeping in mind as we try to understand the ideological positions of the Russian Muslim intelligentsia. However, the documents analyzed in this article suggest that another line in their genealogy, the secularist and deliberately Westernist line that is most visibly represented by Gasprinskiy, had a more definitive impact on Russian Muslim intellectuals' self-identification as members of an intelligentsia at the turn of the 20th century.
To conclude, the Russian Muslim intelligentsia was born around 1905, when we can first document secularly educated progressive Russian Muslim intellectuals conceiving of themselves as a distinct intelligentsia. Gasprinskiy's decades of preparatory work were crucial in the development of this conception, and he ended up coining the Turkic word ziyâlılar to correspond to intelligentsiia in Russian. Gasprinskiy and the Muslim intellectuals who gave birth to the Russian Muslim intelligentsia at the turn of the 20th century followed the example of the Russian, Polish, and other intelligentsias in the tsarist empire in fashioning themselves as a Muslim intelligentsia. A patriotic sense of social responsibility-a commitment to improving the lives of their coreligionists by reforming what they perceived to be the secular aspects of life such as education, industry, agricultural production, and ability to interact in non-Muslim contexts-was the defining core of the Muslim intelligentsia's self-definition. Realizing these goals required them to carve out a sphere of influence among the empire's Russian Muslim population. However, their efforts to promote social and cultural improvement overlapped with Islamic scholars' historically established societal and administrative functions. That overlap could have led to some form of cooperation, similar to the cooperation of Russian intellectuals and tsarist bureaucrats before the 1860s, but in the end, the intelligentsia's (or the Jadidists') secularist mode of thinking spurred conflict instead, similar to the clash between the Russian intelligentsia and the tsarist state in the aftermath of the Great Reforms.
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